When I joined my first role in financial services, the organisation had a Head of Risk. That was not unusual. By 2008, risk management had established itself as a fixture of organisational governance, particularly in regulated sectors. What did not exist was any equivalent function focused on resilience. Business continuity, to the extent it existed at all, was an extension of disaster recovery, which was itself a function of IT. It sat, in practice, under the Chief Technology Officer, a capable home for the technical components, but a structural limitation for everything else.

That, too, was not unusual. It was the norm.

Risk Earned Its Seat. Resilience Was Left Standing.

The professionalisation of risk management over the past two decades is a legitimate achievement. Driven by regulatory pressure, financial crises, and a growing recognition that risk could not be left to chance or convention, organisations across every sector elevated the function. The Chief Risk Officer, or Head of Risk, became a C-suite fixture. Boards expected it. Regulators required it. Investors looked for it.

The assumption embedded in that elevation was sound: decisions with material risk implications should involve risk professionals at the point those decisions are made. Not after. Not in review. At the point.

Business continuity and resilience did not follow that trajectory. They remain, almost universally, managed several levels below executive leadership. The function responsible for building the organisation’s capacity to withstand, adapt to, and recover from disruption sits — in most organisations today — at a level that affords it neither the visibility nor the authority its role demands.

This is not a resource problem. It is a structural one. And it is overdue for correction.

The Asymmetry at the Heart of Organisational Governance

Consider what this arrangement actually says.

The function dedicated to identifying, quantifying, and where possible avoiding risk — is executive. The function dedicated to ensuring the organisation survives and recovers when risks materialise, when they are missed, or when they exceed anything the risk register anticipated — is not.

This is, on reflection, a structurally curious position. No risk framework is perfect. No organisation avoids all disruption. The implicit logic of elevating risk management is precisely that risks matter — that their consequences are real and potentially severe. But if that is true, then the function that deals with those consequences when avoidance fails is at least equally important. Possibly more so, in a world of growing volatility.

The asymmetry has been normalised to the point where it is rarely examined. It should be.

What Strategic Positioning Actually Delivers

The argument for elevating the resilience function is not primarily about status. It is about what strategic positioning makes possible.

In my own experience, the period in which business continuity functioned most effectively was the period in which it was embedded at the strategic level — not as a sign-off authority, but as a participant in decisions before they were made.

One episode illustrates this precisely. A business development and operations team announced, in a senior leadership meeting, that the organisation was taking on several new clients requiring daily net asset value calculations. The existing client base required only monthly calculations. The ramifications for business continuity would have been missed by most: the recovery time objective for a monthly process is measured in days; for a daily process, it is measured in hours. The technical DR capability at that point was measured in seconds, so the position was sound — and is an example of technology resilience pre-empting requirements — but the episode exposed that consequential operational decisions were being made without any recognition of their resilience implications. The awareness gap was structural, not individual.

That visibility and the ability to potentially intercept a decision before it created a risk existed because the BC function was positioned to intercept it. It was not a matter of superior knowledge. It was a matter of being in the room.

The lesson I draw from this is not procedural. It is structural. Resilience cannot function as a reviewer of decisions already taken. It must be a participant in decisions before they are made. That is not possible from three levels below the executive.

“Resilience cannot function as a reviewer of decisions already taken. It must be a participant in decisions before they are made.”

Operating Where Risk Was Unavoidable

The context in which that programme operated sharpened the point considerably. In a Caribbean jurisdiction, certain categories of risk are not theoretical. Hurricane season is annual, and the question is not whether a storm will occur but whether your organisation is ready when one does. That context produces a different relationship with resilience — not as contingency planning for unlikely events, but as a live operational discipline.

The BC programme that emerged from that environment reflected its positioning. A sub-five-second global failover capability. Multi-level communications capability. Recovery scenarios that were tested, not assumed. These outcomes were possible in part because resilience had genuine organisational standing, because the people responsible for it had access to the decisions that shaped it.

When that positioning was subsequently removed — not through deliberate choice, but through the structural consequences of organisational change — the value it had created became visible in its absence. The lesson was not that the successor organisations were wrong. It was that strategic positioning, once removed, cannot easily be substituted. The role matters because the access matters.

Risk and Resilience: Different Jobs, Same Table

The case for a Chief Resilience Officer is sometimes misread as a territorial argument. A bid to subordinate or duplicate the risk function. It is neither.

Risk management and resilience management are distinct disciplines with different objectives, operating on different timescales. The difference becomes most visible under pressure.

Consider a ransomware attack. The risk function is simultaneously managing regulatory notification obligations, board communication, liability exposure, and reputational containment. The resilience function is focused on damage limitation, system recovery, and the continuity of critical operations. Both are urgent. Both are consequential. Neither can adequately perform the other’s role.

If those two functions sit at the same level, the same table, the same access, the same standing, they coordinate effectively at precisely the moment coordination matters most. If resilience sits three levels below risk, that coordination breaks down. Not because of individual failure, but because the structural conditions for effective coordination do not exist.

This is a symbiotic relationship. Symbiosis requires equivalence.

“This is a symbiotic relationship. Symbiosis requires equivalence.”

Then there is the issue of challenge.

Genuine operational resilience should not simply be an analysis and reporting discipline. It should be there to apply a resilience lens to operational functions, to advise and to challenge that function and to reduce, or eliminate, points of failure and help develop resilient alternatives. The same applies within the technology resilience fields. But challenge without authority can be too readily dismissed, so reporting chains matter, escalation points matter. And the resilience functions need to be able to report into the same authority level as those functions for which they exist to challenge — without fear or favour.

What the Professional Standards Already Say

Professional standards

The BCI Good Practice Guidelines identify senior-level sponsorship and support as a foundational requirement, not an optional enhancement. This is not guidance for mature programmes; it is a baseline.

In practice, most organisations interpret this as a senior person who signs off the BC policy annually and lends their name to the business continuity statement. That is not sponsorship. That is endorsement.

Genuine senior engagement means resilience considerations reach decision-makers in time to influence decisions. It means that when the organisation is making choices about operational change, geographic expansion, technology transformation, or client acquisition, the resilience implications are part of the conversation from the outset. The appointment of a Chief Resilience Officer, with the standing, access, and authority that implies, is the most structurally coherent way to deliver what the guidelines already require.

The World Has Changed

The organisations that built risk functions in the early 2000s were responding to a world that had demonstrated, repeatedly, that risk management mattered. They were right to respond. The professionalisation of the function was appropriate to the moment.

The moment has moved on. The volatility that organisations now face, whether that be geopolitical, climatic, technological, or societal, is of a different order. What was genuinely difficult to anticipate a few years ago is not difficult to anticipate today; it is already happening. The arc of disruption is not flattening. It is accelerating.

No risk register keeps pace with that environment indefinitely. Risks will be missed. Events will exceed the scenarios that were modelled. Disruption will occur, not as a possibility to be managed, but as a condition to be navigated.

In that context, the function that builds the capacity to withstand, adapt, and recover is not a secondary concern. It is a primary one.

The Seat That Is Missing

This is not an argument against risk management. The risk function is essential, and the case for its executive standing remains sound.

It is an argument that resilience deserves equivalent standing — not beneath, not adjacent in name only, but at the same level, with the same structural access to organisational decision-making. The Chief Resilience Officer is not a title in search of a purpose. It is a function in search of the positioning it already warrants.

Organisations that build genuine resilience into their governance architecture, including by seating it at the level where decisions are made, will be better placed for the disruption that is coming. Not because they will avoid it. But because they will be ready.

“The seat is missing. It needs to be filled.”